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Purpose- The aim of this study is to examine 
whether audit committee meetings and attendance 
during audit committee is associated with accrual 
earnings management. 
Design/methodology/approach- The sample of the 
study is 14 companies under the Industrial Goods 
sub-sector listed under the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) for the years 2012-2014. Modified 
Jones Model (1995) was used to measure earnings 
management proxied by discretionary accruals. 
Findings- The findings show that frequency of 
audit committee meetings and attendance during 
the meetings negatively and significantly associated 
with discretionary accruals. 
Theoretical implications- This study extends the 
previous related literature by examining the 
association between audit committee meeting and 
attendance and earnings management. 
Practical implications- Regulators might use the 
findings of the study to regulate and further control 
the attendance of audit committee members during 
audit committee meetings 
Originality/value- This paper uses agency theory 
to provide empirical evidence on the importance of 
frequent audit committee meetings and higher 
attendance in audit committee meetings. 
Keywords- earnings management, corporate 
governance, audit committee meeting, audit 
committee attendance, discretionary accruals, 
1. Introduction 
 Several researchers studied audit committee 
considering its role in mitigating earnings 
management (Amar, 2014; Crisan & Fulop, 2014; 
Fang, Huang, & Karpoff , 2015; Miko, 2016). The 
committee is very important because its primary 
assignment has to do with financial reporting 
process (Crişan & Fülöp, 2014). The committee is 
responsible for vetting of financial statements and 
engagement with external auditors on behalf of the 
board to prevent occurrence of managerial 
opportunism. Managers utilized information 
asymmetry advantage and flexibility allowed by the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
to manipulate earnings for personal benefits (Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999). Audit committee is expected to 
verify the accounting numbers prepared by the 
managers in order to reestablish the confidence of 
shareholders. Action or inaction of audit committee 
led to financial scandal and collapse of many 
companies around the world such as Enron and 
Xerox (Pacot, Ruiz, & Virador, 2013; Ronen & 
Yaari, 2008).  Therefore, the presence of an audit 
committee may not be the solution to managerial 
opportunism rather the effectiveness of the 
committee. The effectiveness of the audit 
committee is a function of it competence, diligent, 
independence and activity (Piot and Kermiche 
2009; Bédard and Gendron 2010). Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (SOX hereafter) of 2002 addresses features of 
audit committee including its composition and 
authority but did not address the aspect of 
frequency of meeting (Braswell, Daniels, Landis 
and Ching (2012). However, regulators have made 
recommendations on a minimum number of 
meetings to be held by the audit committee.   
The believe is that audit committee meetings show 
how serious the committee is and gives the 
committee chance to engage the external auditors, 
which can lead to  lower accounting manipulation 
(Saleh et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2003). Many prior 
studies used absolute number of meetings to 
measure audit committee activity (Abbott et al., 
2004; Sáenz González & García-Meca, 2014; 
Soliman and Ragab, 2014). However, sometimes 
the members do not attend the meetings. When this 
happens, only few members may end up taking 
important decisions that can affect the whole 
company. The aim of this paper is to find out 
whether absenteeism by the audit committee 
members during meetings impedes the committee 
from mitigating earnings management practice in 
Nigeria. The Code of Corporate Governance 2003 
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in Nigeria recommends minimum of three meetings 
per annum, while the revised Code 2011 only 
recommends disclosure of audit committee 
attendance in financial report. This shows that the 
attendance is very important not only the number or 
frequency of meetings.  
1. Corporate Governance Reform in Nigeria 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA 1990) 
is the bedrock of corporate governance in Nigeria 
(Idigbe, 2007). However, the first generic Code of 
Corporate Governance for public firms came into 
effect in 2003. Afterwards, Corporate Governance 
Codes for specific industries such as banks, 
Insurance and pension were released. Okike (2007) 
points out that the multiplicity of Corporate 
Governance Codes in Nigeria brought more 
confusion into the system. The report of ROSC in 
2011 found the generic Code of 2003 ineffective 
after the joint review of corporate governance 
system by IMF and World Bank. That led to the 
birth of 2011 Code in order to strengthen the 
system and to curtail managerial opportunism. The 
ROSC (2011) report identified serious gap in the 
2003 Code, which public companies especially 
banks capitalized upon to swell their earnings 
opportunistically. So many banks collapsed during 
the period (Sanusi, 2010) and so many financial 
scandals happened such as Cadbury’s case 
(Abdullahi, Enyinna, & Stella, 2010)    
To further strengthen the audit committee, the 
revised Code 2011 specifically requested disclosure 
of number of meetings held by audit committee and 
the attendance of each member. This is to 
encourage and track the attendance of members. It 
is expected that attendance could enhance 
monitoring.  
2. Theoretical framework   
Agency theory suggests that increasing monitoring 
of managers would minimize their tendency for 
earnings manipulation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Accordingly, Vafeas (1999) points out that agency 
theory supports an active audit committee who 
constantly engage the management, external and 
internal auditors to ensure that financial figures 
prepared by the managers are accurate. Therefore, 
an inactive audit committee cannot monitor 
management or engage the external auditors. 
Furthermore, when audit committee members are 
inactive and do not attend meetings, the monitoring 
role of that committee may reduce allowing for 
opportunistic earnings management.  
4. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
4.1 Earnings Management 
Schipper (1989, p.92) defines earnings 
management practice as “purposeful intervention in 
the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain”.  This is 
possible because of the flexibility and level of 
discretion managers of companies have in reporting 
the financial performance of their firms. Secondly, 
the managers have more access to information 
concerning the company than the shareholders who 
are outsiders (Spohr, 2005). Managerial 
opportunism as explained by the agency theory is 
the outcome of the natural conflict of interest 
between managers and owners of business (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Managers being human and 
rational may be motivated to protect their personal 
interest not that of the shareholders who are the 
owners of the business. Mangers get motivated to 
manipulate  earnings  because  shareholders and 
other stakeholders consider earnings as the most 
important indicator of good performance ( Xiong 
2006). They also want to maximize their bonus 
because managerial bonuses and allowances are 
tight to earnings. 
4.2 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
and Earnings Management 
Bank Britain defined audit committee as "a 
subcommittee of the board of directors that is 
responsible to follow-up financial matters in the 
company and to assist the board in making 
financial decisions, in which the board may not 
have the time and expertise to know its details” 
(cited in Alkdai & Hanefah, 2012, p.54). Audit 
committee can only discharge its duties diligently 
only if it is active (Dezoort et al., 2002). Many 
studies established negative relationship between 
earnings management and frequency of meeting 
(Abbott  et al., 2003; Abbott, & Parker 2000; 
Garven, 2015; Ioualalen et al., 2015; Menon & 
Williams, 1994; Saleh et al., 2007; Stewart & 
Munro, 2007; Vafeas,1999; Xie et al., 2003).  
 However, other studies established that frequency 
of audit committee meeting do not make the 
committee effective and do not mitigate earnings 
mangement (Bédard et al., 2004; Goodwin-Stewait 
& Kent, 2006). The argument is that other factors 
like independence and expertise of the audit 
committee mitigate earnings management not 
frquency of meeting. It was argued that audit 
committee independence, expertise and frequency 
of meeting compliment each other (Goodwin-
Stewait & Kent, 2006). Others document that audit 
committee in general has no relationship with 
earnings management (Kim, & Yoon. 2016). They 
provide evidence that there is no difference in 
earnings management between companies with 
audit committee and those without audit committee 
in Korea. Based on these conflicting results, this 
study hypothesizes that frequency of audit 
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committee meetings would lead to lower earnings 
management. 
H1:  The more frequent the audit committee (AC) 
meeting, the lower the earnings management (EM) 
4.3 Audit Committee Attendance and Earnings 
Management  
The argument is that whether absolute number of 
audit committee meeting guarantee its efectiveness 
in curbing earnings management. Most previous 
studies used number of meetings as a yardstick for 
effective audit committee (Sáenz González & 
García-Meca ,2014; Soliman & Ragab , 2014). 
However, in the real sense not all audit committee 
members attend meetings at a time. It was argued 
that the annual number of meeting is not the precise 
yardstick of the effectiveness of audit committee 
(Menon & Williams, 1994). Maraghni and Nekhili 
(2014) noted that audit committee that sits 
frequently but with different set of people due 
absenteeism could not be diligent. In order to 
encourage attendance during audit committee, the 
Nigerian corporate governance Code 2011 
mandates all public companies to disclose the 
number of meetings held during the year and the 
attendance of each director at the meetings. 
However, no empirical study examines whether the 
percentage of attendance is associated with 
earnings management.  
 Furthermore, Maraghni and Nekhili (2014) used 
three different measurements for audit committee 
diligent. One of them is the percentage of audit 
committee member’s attendance. This study adopts 
this measurement and hypothesizes that high 
attendance in audit committee would lead to lower 
earnings management.  
H2: The higher the attendance in audit committee 
(AC) meetings, the lower the earnings management 
(EM). 
5. Research Methodology and Sample Selection 
This research  is carried out  among  public 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock xchange 
(NSE); Secondary data is collected from  14 
companies under the industrial goods sub-sector 
from 2012 – 2014. These are the years when 
disclosure of number of meetings along with 
attendance of each director was made compulsury.  
The year 2011 is not considered being an inception 
year. 
 
Table 5.1 Sample Size 
Industry Type Industry Code 
 
Number of Companies 
Observations 
Industrial Goods 1 14 42 
5.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals is used to measure earnings 
management. Modified Jones model (1995) is 




TA = Total accruals, which is the variation between  
net income and cashflow from operating activities 
 
DA = Discretionary accruals 
NDA =  Nondiscretionary accruals 
The model used the following equation: 
TAC/Ait-1 = α1 (1/Ait-1) + α2 (ΔREVit/Ait-1) + 
α3 (PPEit/ Ait-1) + μit.  
Where: 
TACit= total accruals for firm i in year t. 
 NDAi,t = nondiscretionary accruals for company i 
in year t 
Ai,t-1 = lagged (one year) total assets 
ΔREVi,t = change in revenues for company i in 
year t 
ΔARi,t = change in net receivables for company i 
in year t 
PPEi,t = property, plant and equipment for 
company i in year t 
Control Variables: This study uses a number of 
control variables -  firm size, leverage and 
profitability as has been used by previous studies 
(Ioualalen et al., 2015; Machuga & Teitel , 2009;  
Sáenz González & García-Meca, 2014; Saleh et al., 
2005). 
Firm Size (FS): 
 This study measures firm size (FS) by the natural 
logarithm of total assets at the end of the year 
(Sáenz González & García-Meca, 2014).  To avoid 
political costs such as stringent regulations, big size 
firms disclose more financial and non-financial 
information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Leverage (LEV): 
This study measures leverage as a percentage of  
debt to total  assets (Saleh et al., 2005). Highly 
leveraged firms are assumed to have higher 
discretionary accruals (Watts & Zimmerman , 
1978).  
Profitability (PROFIT) 
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This study used Return on Assets (ROA) to 
measure profitability (Machuga & Teitel , 2009). It 
is the Net income in year t-1 scaled by total assets 
at year t-1. The assumption is that highly profitable 
firms have lower discretionary accruals.  
Table 5.2  
Measurement of Variables 








AC_MEET Audit Committee 
Meeting 
Number of meetings 
held in a year 
Xie et al. (2003) Negative (-) 








FS Firm Size natural logarithm of 
total assets at the end 






LEV Leverage proportion of  total 
debt to total assets 
Saleh et al. 
(2005) , Habbash 
et al. (2014) 
Positive (+) 
PROFIT Return on Assets   Net income in year t-1 
scaled by total assets at 
year t-1 




 EM is earnings management, AC_MEET is audit committee meeting, AC_ATTEND is audit committee 
attendance, FS is firm size, LEV is leverage, PROFIT is profitability 
The model of the study is: 
DACit = β0 + β1 (AC_MEET)it  + β2 (AC_ATTEND)it + (Control)it +  eit        (1) 
Where: AC_MEET = Audit committee meeting 
AC_ATTEND = Percentage of attendance of audit committee meetings 
 
6. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
The result of the descriptive analysis as per Table 6.1 reveals that the mean of the audit committee meeting is 
3.5, minimum of 2 and maximum of 7. The code of corporate governance 2003 recommends minimum of 3 
meetings annually. This shows that on the averge all the companies comply with this criteria. However, some 
companies violates the recommendation and held only 2 meetings . The mean of the audit committee attendance 
is 66% suggesting that 34% of the audit committee members failed to attend meetings. The minimum percentage 
of attendance is 30% and maximum attendance is 100%. The Codes of corporate governance 2003 and 2011 did 
not mention how many audit committee members can form a quorum . It is left for the companies to set the 
quorum. 
Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
DAC -3.882 1.610 -0.453 0.971 -1.627 4.363 
AC_MEET 2.000 7.000 3.500 0.804 1.774 7.759 
AC_ATTEND 0.300 1.000 0.663 0.201 0.384 -1.014 
FS 8.709 11.984 9.946 0.891 0.814 -0.169 
LEVE 0.195 1.530 0.586 0.311 1.692 2.924 
PROFIT -0.321 0.403 0.079 0.141 -0.769 1.504 
DAC is the absolute discretionary accruals, ACMEET is audit committee meeting, ACATTEND is audit 
committee attendance, FS is firm size, LEV is leverage, PROFIT is profitability 
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 Normality assumption was tested  using skewness and kurtosis. According to Hair, Tatham, Anderson and 
Black (2006) the benchmark for skewness is ±3, while that of Kurtosis is ±10 according to Kline (1998). The 
result as shown in table 6.1 shows that the dataset is distributed normally. Similarly, to ascertain absence of 
multicollinearity, Pearson correlation is used to determine correlation matrix between the variables. Table 6.2 
shows that no correlation is higher than 0.80, which means absence of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2006). 
Table 6.2 
Correlation Matrix of Variables 
 
DAC AC_MEET AC_ATTEND FS LEV PROFIT 
DAC 1 
     AC_MEET -0.2427* 1 
    
AC_ATTEND 0.2132 -0.430 1 
   FS -0.1399 0.328 0.0538** 1 
  LEV -0.0294 -0.024 0.012** -2798 1 
 PROFIT -0.0813 0.143 -0.150 0.301 0.084** 1 
 ***, **, * is significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. DAC is the absolute discretionary accruals, 
 ACMEET is audit committee meeting, ACATTEND is audit committee attendance, FS is firm size, 
 LEV is leverage, PROFIT is profitability 
 
Additional t-test is carried out by to find out whether companies with high percentage of attendance have lower 
discretionary accruals. A company falls under low attendance if the average attendance of members is 50% and 
below. On the other hand, if the average attendance of audit committee members during meetings is above 51%, 
the company falls under high attendance. Table 6.3 reveals that that companies with high audit committee 
attendance have lower discretionary accruals (-0.085) compared to those with lower attendance (-0.601). The 
result confirmed the expectation of this study that high attendance during audit committee meetings reduce 
discretionary accruals. The members including the expertise are all around to engage the external auditors and 
verify the figures submitted by the management. This in line with the findings of Maraghni and Nekhili (2014). 
Table 6.3  
level of DAC based on  percentage of attendance in audit committee  
Group Mean SD F-Value Sig 










Data analysis was carried out using OLS regression to check the model fit. The R-squared is 0.68; F-value is 
0.86 at 1% level of significance.  
Table 6.4 
Multiple Regression Results (OLS) 
Variable  Sign Coefficient t- statistics P-value 
Cons ±  0.005 -1.11 0.710    
AC_MEET – -0.267 -1.23 0.066*    
AC_ATTTEND – -0.084  1.54 0.00***    
FS ± -0.101 -0.47 0. 036**    
LEV ±  0.018  0.05 0.321    












N = 42. ***, **, * is significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. Note: Absolute discretionary 
accrual is the dependent variable, AC_MEET is 
audit committee meeting, AC_ATTEND is audit 
committee attendance, FS is firm size, LEV is 
leverage, PROFIT is profitability. 
Table 6.4 reveals the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the explained variables. 
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Audit committee meeting (AC_MEET) has a 
coefficient of -0.267, t= -1.23 and P-value of 0.066. 
This suggests a negative relation at 10% 
significance. This indicates support for H1. The 
result means that for every one unit increase in 
audit committee meeting, DAC reduces by 0.267. 
In other words, an increase in number of audit 
committee meeting leads to lower discretionary 
accruals in line with the expectation of the study. 
The result is in agreement with the agency theory 
and findings from previous researches (Al-Matari 
et al., 2016; Garven, 2015; Ioualale et al., 2015; 
Mishra &  Malhotra, 2016; Soliman & Ragab, 
2014) .The result however contradicts that of Kent 
et al. (2010).  
The second hypothesis, Table 6.4 shows a 
significant relationship between audit committee 
(AC_ATTEND) and DAC, equally supporting H2. 
The coefficient is -0.084, t is 1.54 and P-value of 
0.000. The result supports the agency theory and 
findings from previous studies (Maraghni & 
Nekhili (2014) and contradicts that of Haji-
Abdullah, Wan-Hussin, & Hussin, (2016). 
  7. Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship 
between audit committee meeting and attendance 
on earnings management. The result provides 
evidence that high frequency of audit committee 
meetings and attendance reduce earnings 
management, which support both hypotheses.  
Furthermore,  the study contributes to the 
understanding of agency theory in developing 
economy. In Nigeria, the Codes of Corporate 
governance both 2003 and 2011 recommend 
minimum of three meetings annually and disclosure 
of the members attendance respectively. The results 
show how importance both the frequency of 
meetings and the attendance are in reducing 
managerial opportunism. Therefore, this study 
provides practical implications expected to help 
regulators, investors, and other market participants 
to improve the financial reporting quality. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would 
find the result handy in ensuring that companies 
comply with the requirements of the Codes with 
regards to the number of  meetings and attendance. 
Nonetheless, this study is restricted to only one 
sub-sector (Industrial goods) from 2012-2014 
among the ten to sub-sectors under the non-
financial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE). Therefore, the researchers 
recommend further study to cover the entire non-
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